

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

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AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

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USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 15712

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL, GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GW, UR

SUBJECT: CSCE: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH AMBASSADOR BRUNNER

BEGIN SUMMARY: DURING OCT 29 CONVERSATION WITH
EMBOFF, CSCE DEL CHIEF BRUNNER SAID PACE OF CSCE
COMMITTEE STATE SO FAR GOING AS EXPECTED, DRAFTING
MAY START IN DEC. AND NEGOTIATING CRUNCH IS LIKELY TO
BE REACHED IN MARCH/APRIL OF NEXT YEAR. AS BRUNNER
SEES IT, THE SOVIET DEL IS PARTICULARLY TALENTED AND
IS AVOIDING OVERT PRESSURE TACTICS IN ORDER TO AVOID
PLACING ITSELF IN ROLE OF DEMANDEUR. WESTERN DELS ARE
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ALSO HOLDING TOGETHER WELL AND FRG EXPECTS REASONABLE

COMPROMISES TO EMERGE ON SECURITY COMMITTEE ISSUES. KEY QUESTION IN BRUNNER'S MIND IS WHETHER SOVIET INTERNATIONAL POSTURE HAS EVOLVED SUFFICIENTLY IN RECENT YEARS TO FACILITATE COMPROMISES IN SECOND AND THIRD BASKETS SATISFACTORY TO THE WEST AND THEREBY JUSTIFYING CSCE FINALE; SOVIET WISHES FOR SUMMIT AND FOLLOW ON ALSO WILL DEPEND ON THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. BRUNNER VOICED SUPPORT FOR BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR ONE COMPREHENSIVE CSCE FINAL DOCUMENT. END SUMMARY.

1. SOVIET APPROACH. AMBASSADOR BRUNNER TOLD EMBOFF THAT BONN STILL BELIEVES THE USSR HOPES TO MAKE CSCE A DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS BUT HAS APPARENTLY CHANGED ITS TACTICS FROM THE MPT PHASE. IN PARTICULAR, IN BRUNNER'S VIEW, THE SOVIETS ARE DOING THEIR BEST TO AVOID BEING CAST INTO A DEMANDEUR ROLE OR TO PAY A SUBSTANTIAL PRICE IN BASKETS II AND III FOR POTENTIAL BASKET I GAINS. THUS, THE RUSSIAN DEL SEEKS TO AVOID INDICATIONS OF IMPATIENCE WITH THE CONFERENCE RHYTHM AND TO AVOID DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF THE SPECIFIC WESTERN PROPOSALS. THE SOVIETS STILL WISH A SUMMIT FINALE, AT WHICH THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WOULD BE SIGNED BY CHIEFS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AND THUS WOULD BE ACCORDED GREATER WEIGHT THAN OTHER CSCE DOCUMENTS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE RUSSIANS WISH TO AVOID PAYING THE PRICE FOR A SUMMIT. BRUNNER CONSIDERED THE CURRENT SOVIET DEL TEAM MORE SOPHISTICATED THAN THE SOVIET DEL IN HELSINKI. VARYING LINGUISTIC ABILITY OF KOLALEV (GERMAN), DUBININ (FRENCH), AND MENDELEVICH (ENGLISH), THE EFFECTIVE DIVISION OF LABOR IN THE SOVIET DEL AND THE ABILITY TO MAKE QUICKER DECISIONS ON THE SPOT DUE TO THE VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER'S PRESENCE TOGETHER MADE THE SOVIET DEL A FORMIDABLE TEAM.

2. WESTERN APPROACH. BRUNNER THOUGHT THE WEST HAD DONE PRETTY WELL SO FAR AT GENEVA, INTRODUCING DETAILED PAPERS ON A REGULAR BASIS AND ADHERING IN A BUSINESS-LIKE WAY TO THE INDUCTIVE APPROACH. LIKE THE BRITISH (USNATO 5140), BRUNNER SAID BONN DESIRES SPECIFIC RESULTS FROM THE CONFERENCE BOUND UP INTO ONE FINAL DOCUMENT SUCH AS UNCTAD "FINAL ACT." THE FRG HAS NO SET

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IDEAS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SUMMIT FINALE, STILL TYING THIS PROSPECT TO EVENTUAL SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS. BUT BRUNNER BELIEVES IT WOULD BE TACTICALLY DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR THE WEST NOW TO EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED RECENT US EXPRESSION OF PREFERENCE FOR A THIRD CSCE STAGE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, BUT SAID IT WAS PRESENTLY PREMATURE TO MAKE A FINAL DETERMINATION ON THIS QUESTION. BRUNNER SAID THE THOUGHT IT

WOULD BE MARCH OR APRIL BEFORE DRAFTING NEGOTIATIONS
WOULD MAKE CLEAR THE LIKELY RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE.
BONN THEREFORE PREFERRED TO RESERVE ITS OPINION ON THE
SUMMIT AND FOLLOW-ON ISSUES UNTIL THAT TIME.

3. SECURITY ISSUES. TURNING TO BASKET I, BRUNNER SAID
HE DID NOT EXPECT A MAJOR PROBLEM IN EVENTUALLY FINDING
COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS THAT WOULD AT LEAST FORMALLY SWEEP
THE BREZHNEV DOCUMENT OFF THE TABLE, PRODUCE A
DECLARATION REFLECTING THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS BUT NO MORE, SATISFACTORILY LINK THE PRINCIPLES
OF INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS AND NON-USE OF FORCE IN A
WAY CLEARLY HOLDING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACEFUL
BORDER CHANGES AND MODESTLY YET MEANINGFULLY ENHANCE THE
DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE MILITARY SECURITY FIELD.
BRUNNER TENDED TO BRUSH OFF THE RECENT MENDELEVICH
OUTBURST ON CBMS (GENEVA 5579), ATTRIBUTING IT TO
NEGOTIATION TACTICS AND THE SOVIET DELS' WISH TO IMPRESS
MOSCOW WITH THEIR TOUGHNESS VIS-A-VIS WESTERN DELS. AS
TO MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY, BRUNNER SAW THE GENEVA
OPERATION STRICTLY AS A STEP AT CONFIDENCE BUILDING.
HE NOTED THAT CBMS WOULD BE VOLUNTARY AND WOULD INVOLVE
FLEXIBLE NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES. BRUNNER SAID BONN
WISHED TO AVOID CSCE MILITARY/SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
INTERFERING IN ANY WAY WITH MBFR PROJECT. WHEN ASKED BY
EMBOFF CONCERNING POSSIBLE CSCE TREATMENT OF MILITARY
MOVEMENTS, BRUNNER SAID THE WEST SHOULD TAKE NO PROPOSAL
IT IS UNWILLING TO ACCEPT BUT SHOULD NOT REFRAIN FROM
PROPOSALS BECAUSE THEY MAY NOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE USSR.
HE SAID GERMAN DEFENSE AUTHORITIES CONSIDER CBMS
ON MOVEMENTS WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL. WHILE
THE EAST MAY KILL THIS PROPOSAL, BRUNNER SAID THE
EXPERIENCE OF THE LAST DAYS AT THE MPT SHOW THEY MAY
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ALSO EVENTUALLY ACCEPT IT IN SOME FORM. IN ANY CASE,
THE GERMANS STILL FAVOR A CBM ON MOVEMENTS.

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4. SOVIET ATTITUDE BASKETS II AND III. IN COMMENTING ON BASKETS II AND III, BRUNNER SAID KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY HAS EVOLVED SUFFICIENTLY FROM EARLIER APPROACH OF "IDEOLOGICALLY ORIENTED REVOLUTIONARY POWER" TO FACILITATE SATISFACTORY COMPROMISES IN SECOND AND THIRD BASKETS. BRUNNER SAID THIS WAS THE QUESTION FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL AS RAISING IMPLICITLY IN HIS HELSINKI MINISTERIAL SPEECH. SCHEEL POSED QUESTION WHETHER NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT PRODUCE RESULTS SO MEAGER AS TO WARRANT POSTPONEMENT OF CSCE EXERCISE UNTIL A LATER DATE. IN BRUNNER'S VIEW THE JURY IS STILL OUT ON THIS QUESTION. BRUNNERR NOTED, IN THIS CONNECTION, RECENT DIE ZEIT ARTICLE BY SOVIET EXCHANGE STUDENT WHICH LABORIOUSLY SOUGHT TO ALIGN CURRENT SECRET

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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY WITH THE "DOGMAT OF THE LENINIST CHURCH." HE SAID IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHETHER THIS IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION OR THE SOVIET MOVEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WERE RITUALISTIC AND FORMALISTIC OR DEEPLY ROOTED MOTIVATION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY.

5. THESE QUESTIONS WILL, IN BRUNNER'S VIEW, HAVE TO BE

VIEWS RATHER DIRECTLY IN NEGOTIATIONS ON SUCH TOUGH ISSUES AS MARRIAGE, FAMILY REUNIFICATION, DIFFUSION OF INFORMATION AND PUBLICATIONS, WORKING CONDITIONS OF JOURNALISTS, INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION AND COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES. BRUNNER EMPHASIZED THAT EVEN BASKET II ISSUES WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR SOVIETS AS SUCCESS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION ENTAILS SUBSTANTIAL AUGMENTATION OF CONTACTS. HE NOTED OBVIOUS SOVIET INTEREST IN SOME ECONOMIC COOPERATION TOPICS, BUT ALSO OBSERVED THAT RUSSIANS FREQUENTLY AND SUDDENTLY HAMPER COOPERATION OUT OF FEAR THAT THEY CANNOT COPE WITH THE DEGREE OF CONTACTS. THESE SOVIET CONCERNS ARE, OF COURSE, ALL THE MORE PERTINENT IN BASKET III, WHICH RAISES IN MANY RUSSIAN MINDS THE MOST SERIOUS IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS. IN ADDITION, SOVIET INTERNAL POLITICAL JOCKEYING AND PERSONAL AMBITIONS ARE LIKELY, IN BRUNNER'S VIEW, TO IMPACT TO SOME EXTENT ON THE SOVIET ATTITUDE. HOWEVER, IN THE GERMAN VIEW, THE WEST WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO ACCEPT "REASONABLE BARGAINS" WHICH MAY BE OBTAINED FROM THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA ON THEIR FACE VALUE. WHAT IS ESSENTIAL, IN BRUNNER'S VIEW, IS THAT THERE BE AT LEAST A MINIMAL GROWTH OF CONTACTS IF CSCE FINALE IS TO CONVENE. TO EMBOFF'S QUESTION, BRUNNER SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD SUSTAIN A BREAKUP OF THE CONFERENCE IF SOVIETS PROVE WHOLLY UNYIELDING ON BASKETS II AND III. BUT BRUNNER EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS NOT HIS EXPECTATION. HILLENBRAND

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